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Abstract: Although explicitly prohibited by the WTO Subsidy Code, official export
insurance agencies in most industrialised countries operate with long term budgetary
losses.  This practice is labelled as export insurance subsidisation.  Official export
insurance schemes are often used for several purposes.  While their prime objective is
the provision of insurance coverage against the  risk of default faced by domestic
exporters, these insurance programs are not seldom embedded in more global policy
objectives of the domestic government.   This paper investigates how more general
government objectives like strategic export promotion and official development
assistance can be comprised in official export insurance.
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INTRODUCTION
Part of the literature on trade under uncertainty focuses on the scope for trade policy
as a substitute for missing or incomplete insurance markets.  While Eaton and
Grossman (1985) argue that trade intervention may serve as a second-best (partial)
substitute for unavailable insurance contracts, Dixit (1989, 1990) stresses that in most
cases the correct policy is not trade related.  In this paper, the question is reversed.
More specifically, we investigate to what extent insurance policies, given that these are
publicly provided, can incorporate trade related goals or other complementary motives.
In other words, is it feasible and  desirable to use insurance  contracts  for other
purposes beside the prime objective of efficient risk allocation?
We concentrate on the case of export insurance, in most OECD countries provided by
(semi-)public agencies.  Export insurance policies offer coverage against default risk.
Empirical  studies (Abraham (1990); Abraham, Couwenberg and Dewit (1992))
indicate that in several countries official export insurers are operating with a sustained
budgetary loss.  According to the WTO Subsidy Code such practice is labelled as
subsidisation and explicitly prohibited.  This paper asserts under which circumstances
this form of subsidisation can be optimal for individual countries when official export
insurers embrace an objective function blended with different goals.
Two alternative policy motives are discussed.  First, because this type of insurance is
inseparably linked to export activities of domestic firms, the terms at which coverage is
provided are likely to contain a strategic element.  The now well-established strand in
the trade policy literature on strategic export promotion (among others developed by
Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986), Dixit (1987) and Helpman
and Krugman (1989)) points out that economies can improve domestic welfare by
subsidising exports under specific oligopolistic behaviour in the export market.  We
examine whether and how the optimal strategic trade intervention rule alters when the
motive of strategic export promotion is encapsulated in official export insurance
programs.  Second, the risk of default is predominantly relevant for  exports to
developing countries.  Moreover, official export insurance schemes often are included2
in the domestic country’s package of official development aid.  Hence, the possibility
of aid-inspired export insurance subsidies is also explored in this study.
The practice of official export insurance is discussed in general in section one.  Section
two is devoted to the analysis of the pure  insurance motive of official insurers. In
section three, the motive of strategic export promotion is introduced and optimal trade
policy rules for insured exports are determined.  Finally, the scope for aid-inspired
export insurance is assessed in section three.
1. OFFICIAL EXPORT INSURANCE: SPECIFIC FEATURES
In this section the main characteristics of official export insurance are described and
the instrumental specifics of insurance contracts are discussed.  Export contracts
stipulating a certain credit term imply defer of payment until the credit expires.  In that
case, exporters may  be  confronted with default by the foreign importer at the
expiration  date of the contract.  In most industrialised economies, risk averse firms
facing a risk of default can apply for insurance at an official export insurance agency.
Insurance contracts have some specific features which makes them attractive policy
instruments.  Optimal contracts determine a premium and associated coverage, placing
a double instrumental variable at the official insurer’s disposal.  Moreover, premium
and coverage can be either specified in levels or as rates.  Hence, the particular form of
the insurance contract provides an additional degree of policy freedom.
The maximum coverage rate stipulated in export insurance policies varies between
85% and 100%, often approaching full insurance. With some exceptions, insured
exports in most industrialised economies roughly account for 10% to 20% of total
exports
1.  A striking feature of official export insurance schemes is that these usually
involve  export  subsidisation.  In practice, this means that the premium income
collected does not suffice to cover the reimbursements claimed by insured firms.
                                                       
1 For more detailed figures on this measure, we refer to Dewit (1996), p. 9.3
Broadly speaking, subsidy rates, measured as the difference between claims and
premiums as a percentage of insured contracts, range between 2% and 12%.  Although
these figures may seem moderate or even rather low at first sight, global subsidy
estimates conceal a considerably skewed regional pattern in export insurance
subsidisation.  More specifically, insured exports to developing countries receive the
bulk of the subsidies. These contracts are characterised by a high risk of default.
Meanwhile,  European countries as well as industrialised economies in general are non-
subsidised export destinations.
The prime objective of public insurers should be the provision of efficient insurance
against the risk of default.  However, because official export agencies are operating for
account of the state, their objective function is likely to be embedded in more general
policy goals of the domestic government. Two such wider policy goals deserve special
attention.  First, since this type of insurance clearly is inseparably linked to an
economy’s risky trade relations, it may be used as an instrument of strategic export
promotion against foreign competitors in third markets.  Second, developing countries
obviously  are  the export  destinations for which official export insurance schemes
especially are significant.  In practice, they are often claimed to be part of public
development aid programs.
Before investigating to what extent official export insurers can design contracts at
terms which are combining these different objectives, we discuss the pure insurance
goal of a public insurance agency and the effect of this type of insurance on exporters.
2. THE INSURANCE OBJECTIVE
In this section, the insurance objective is isolated from potential alternative goals by
assuming perfect competition in the export market, thereby removing any rationale for
strategic export intervention.  A simple benchmark with symmetric information4
between insurer and insured is built, using a one-shot two-stage game
2.  In the first
stage, the official agency decides on the terms of the insurance policies offered, while
insured firms make their decisions for the foreign export market in the second stage.
Solving the game backwards, we start by analysing the exporter’s decision in the last
stage of the game.
2.1. The export decision of the insured firm with perfect competition
A representative risk averse firm maximises its  certainty-equivalent profits  (EV)
generated by exporting to a particular region.  The market structure in the export
destination is perfectly competitive.  We adopt a mean-variance approach to simplify
the formal analysis.  Regional default distributions are assumed to be independent and
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where superscript k denotes a specific export market.  E
k P andvarP
k denote the
expected profits and the variance of profits.  p
k and  x
k  respectively stand for the given
export price and the export volume in market k.  b is a parameter measuring the
degree of risk aversion. The last term in expression (2a) represents the production cost
function.  We assume that marginal costs are increasing to avoid indeterminate
solutions under perfect competition.  The risk of default is captured by l
k , a stochastic
variable distributed with mean E






k >1}=0).  An insured exporter pays the premium rate (i.e., the premium paid per
insured currency unit, denoted byr
k ) stipulated in the insurance policy for the export
                                                       
2 Asymmetric information problems in export insurance  leading to moral hazard and adverse
selection are respectively discussed in Dewit (1996a) and Dewit (1996b).5
market envisaged.  If the foreign importer turns out to be insolvent at the expiration
date of the contract (l
k > 0), the exporter is reimbursed for this loss by the official
insurer insofar the insurance policy provides coverage.  The coverage rate is
symbolised by g
k  (01 ££ g
k ).
Proposition 1: When export insurance contracts stipulate a premium and a coverage
rate, the export volume of a risk averse firm depends on the distribution features of
the default variable, the firm’s attitude to risk and the terms of the insurance
contract.
Proof:
The first order condition of (1) with respect to the export volume is then given by
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Clearly, the characteristics of the default distribution (Ev
kk l ,
2
), the firm’s degree of
risk aversion (b) and the terms of the insurance contract (r
kk , g ) are crucial in the
firm’s export decision.  More particularly, the export volume unambiguously declines
as the coverage rate specified in the available insurance policy decreases as long as the








l >£ 0      ).  This is due to
the fact that exporters cannot choose the coverage rate freely
3. Furthermore, a low
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3 This would be the case with uniform premium rating. Then, given a particular premium rate, export
volumes would not  be  affected by their attitude to risk or the features of the foreign default
distribution (see Funatsu (1986), Abraham and Dewit (1996)).6
2.2. Optimal official export insurance
The actual terms at which insurance contracts are available are  determined by the
official export insurance company in the first stage of the game.  We assume that the
latter disposes of the same information about the risk involved in the contracts as the
firms applying for insurance.
A risk neutral public insurance company maximises certainty-equivalent profits of all
insured firms corrected for the potential subsidy costs it incurs (denoted by the last
term of the objective function in (5)):
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The constraint in (5) guarantees that the insurance contract is efficient.  Efficiency
implies that, at fair premium rates, the coverage stipulated in the policy maximises
certainty-equivalent profits of risk averse exporters.
Proposition 2: Under symmetric information in insurance and with perfectly
competitive export markets, optimal official export insurance policies consist of full
coverage and fair premium rates for all risk categories.
Proof:
From the first stage we know EV
k
x
k = 0and assuming that the domestic country is







0 ).  Hence, with j
(j>0) denoting the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the  constraints in (5), first
order conditions with respect to premium and coverage rate are given by
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The resulting contract terms are not surprising.  With “insurance” as its only objective,
the risk neutral official insurer provides policies at the most favourable terms for risk
averse firms facing a risk of default.  Meanwhile, the contracts offered are efficient
since the uncertainty is completely transferred to the risk neutral agent at a premium
rate which covers the expected costs of bearing the risk involved.
The fact that such contracts are efficient can also be inferred from the volume the
insured firm exports under this insurance regime.  From (4), (7a) and (7b) we obtain
the insured firm’s export quantity
xp E
kk k =- () 1 l (8)
which is equal to the export volume of its risk neutral counterpart (i.e., expression (4)
with b=0).
3. EXPORT INSURANCE AND STRATEGIC EXPORT PROMOTION
Apart from the pure insurance motive, the official statutes of public insurance agencies
stress their role as export promoting institutions.  In this section, we determine the
scope for strategic intervention via export insurance.  Evidently, since this type of
trade policy is based on profit shifting, it is only relevant for specific export markets
where the market structure is oligopolistic.  The literature with respect to this policy
issue suggests strategic intervention via export subsidies
4 when a domestic firm is
competing in a Cournot-Nash fashion with a foreign rival in a third (export) market
(see, among others, Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and  Grossman (1986),
Helpman and Krugman (1989)).  Here, we adopt this market structure in the export
market and argue that strategic export promotion via official export insurance does not
necessarily replicate this standard result.
                                                       
4 This policy is advised given that the stability conditions are not violated.8
Since insurance premiums have to be the same for a specific export region across
domestic industries, we claim that this type of policy may be relevant if that export
destination is mainly served by a particular domestic sector.  Moreover, the foreign
government as well as the government of the third market are assumed to adhere to a
laissez-faire trade policy
5.
Again, we first turn to the second stage of the game, where the firm which now has
oligopolistic market power, determines its optimal export quantity.  We assume that
the domestic industry consists of n
k symmetric firms exporting to a specific region,
while competing in that market with n
k*symmetric foreign rivals.
3.1. The export decision of the insured oligopolist
Assume the products sold by the domestic and foreign firms are homogeneous and  the
demand function in the export market envisaged is linear
6.  The exporter maximises (1)
but now has  some price-setting  power ( pp n x n x
kk k k k k = (, * * ) with  p'< 0).  The
respective first order conditions for the n
k -type and n
k*-type of firm are given by:
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Total differentiation of these first order conditions with respect to the premium rate
























































                                                       
5 The case where both of these governments are  engaged in  active trade intervention is amply
discussed in the literature (Brander and Spencer, 1985, and several others).
































































































































k' and  x
k*' respectively denote export quantities of domestic and foreign rivals.
The effect of an export insurance premium subsidy on export volumes differs from the
impact of a direct subsidy in various respects.  First, if the domestic insurance policy
only provides partial coverage
7, the direct effect of a premium reduction is smaller than












































Second, it is ambiguous how the foreign firm will adjust its export volume as a result
of a domestic premium reduction.  This crucially hinges on whether marginal certainty-
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*  may be
positive.  This is due to the fact that, with a large fraction of foreign exports uncovered
by insurance, lowering the price in the third market by increasing domestic exports
                                                       
7 This will be the case if moral hazard problems enter into the picture, or if the official agency installs
coverage rate ceilings to limit risk exposure of its total contract portfolio.10
may lead to a decrease in the variance of foreign profits.  If the latter effect dominates































































** -  have to be positive) for stability
reasons.
In the next subsection, we derive the optimal terms at which official export insurance
should be provided if the objective function of the government agency is inspired by a
concern for efficient risk allocation as well as a motive for strategic export promotion.
3.2. Optimal insurance and strategic export promotion
Strategic export promotion via export insurance subsidisation involves setting premium
rates below their fair level.  Still, is this always advisable when strategic intervention is
channelled through this export financing instrument?
For the domestic official insurer, the simultaneous use of the premium and the
coverage rate for efficient insurance as well as strategic export promotion is likely to
generate solutions which are  suboptimal for either purpose.   While the  motive of
strategic export promotion tend to dictate a premium subsidy, efficient risk allocation
would advocate fair premium rating.  Meanwhile, strategic premium subsidisation may
induce the export insurance agency to reduce the coverage foreseen in its  policies,
thereby reducing total subsidy costs, whereas public insurance contracts should entail
full coverage in this set-up.  As a result, partial coverage policies at highly subsidised
premium rates would be provided, not only implying inefficient insurance but also
narrowing the scope for strategic intervention as the insured share of risky exports
would have shrunken.11
Hence, guaranteeing efficient use of both  insurance policy variables implies linking
each of the objectives to a specific instrument.  While the coverage rate is instrumental
in efficient insurance, the premium rate is manipulated for the purpose of strategic
export promotion.  Formally speaking, the public insurer faces an optimisation problem
similar to (5), but now domestic firms have market power in the importing country:
max ( )
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Proposition 3:  There is less scope for strategic export subsidisation via export
insurance than via direct export subsidies since
(i) if domestic official export insurance contracts deviate from full coverage, there is
less scope for profit shifting.
(ii) if foreign official export insurance contracts deviate from full coverage, the
optimal trade intervention rule for a Cournot duopoly may involve a premium tax
instead.
Proof:
(i) The first order condition with respect to the premium rate is equal to
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After some rearranging, we obtain the optimal premium rate
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If domestic coverage falls below complete insurance, the profit shifting motive for
strategic export promotion becomes smaller (() ( ) 11 1
22
-- - < - Ep x v E
kk k k k k lbg l for
g
k <1).
(ii) Since the sign of a premium rate subsidy (i.e., the sign of the second term of (15))
crucially depends on the reaction of the foreign export volume to a domestic premium
reduction, a premium rate tax (rE
kk >l ) constitutes the optimal strategic trade







Now that the importance of determining the coverage rate together with the premium
rate has been shown, we maximise (20) with respect to g
k .
Proposition 4: Export insurance premium rates to markets where the risk of default is
high, are more likely to be determined by risk considerations than by strategic export
promotion.
Proof:
Net certainty-equivalent profits are maximised when policies stipulate full coverage,
which is precisely the contract implied by the left hand side of the constraint in (20).  In
fact, the optimal coverage rate is immediately obtained from the constraint associated
with efficient insurance,or







































    
 
                                  
(16)
which amounts to
 g= 1 (17a)
Hence, once again the official insurer should offer full coverage.  Consequently, the
















































the second term in (17) positive for n
k sufficiently small.  Assuming that the relative
number of domestic firms versus foreign competitors is relatively small, the optimal
premium rate contains a subsidy.  However, this subsidy element decreases if expected
default is large (tending to zero for  E
k l® 1 ) while at the same time risk
considerations dictate a higher premium rate.
4. EXPORT INSURANCE, STRATEGIC EXPORT PROMOTION AND
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)
In this section we argue that, besides their involvement in strategic export promotion,
governments may  still grant export subsidies to insured exporters if some special
political interest in the importing country is reflected in their objective function.  As
these benefits are  not provided for (static) domestic welfare improvements in the
traditional sense, and this type of policy may generate positive welfare effects in the
recipient country we label this motive as politically inspired development aid.
Evidently,  the reason  why  such aid is granted lies in the likelihood that the beneficial
welfare effects in the developing country may (partly) spillover to the donor country in
the long run.  The results of comprising this political issue in export insurance are
consecutively discussed with perfect competition in the  export market and  when
domestic exporters are competing in a Cournot fashion with foreign firms in a third
market with oligopolistic features.
4.1. ODA in public export insurance14
Suppose the domestic government has some political interests in a particular export
market.  Providing cheap insurance to its risk averse domestic exporters gives the
latter a competitive edge in that region.  In other words, it gives them the opportunity
to “tie” foreign consumers to the cheaply imported products.  Obviously, this
politically inspired consumer-tying is only valid to the extent that foreign buyers in the
export market value those products.  One way of modelling this motive is by including
the foreign consumer surplus engendered from consuming the product involved into
the objective function of the public insurance agency.  Focusing on the effect of this
motive on premium rating we return to the initially assumed market structure of
perfect competition in the third market, hence removing any reason for strategic
intervention.  However, we now assume that the exporting economy may  be large
enough to affect its terms of trade.  This is reasonable since the domestic government
is more likely to include a political concern for the developing country involved if its
export products are important for the domestic exporting industry.
Formally, the official insurer’s objective function is hence formulated as:
max ( ) **( **, ) **
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The squared bracketed term in the objective function in (18) denotes the consumer
surplus from buying the (domestically subsidised) product.  ** indicates variables
associated with consumers in the export market with V** and E** standing for the
indirect utility function and the expenditure level respectively.  a is a positive constant
parameter symbolising the weight of the political aid motive in the agency’s general
objective formulation.
Proposition 5:  There is more scope for ODA-related subsidies to a particular
destination if the product involved is provided by few domestic exporters and is
important enough in the importing country’s import package.
Proof:15
Again, the efficient-insurance  constraint guarantees full coverage (g
k =1), reducing
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The second term of (20) clearly reflects the  terms of trade effect,  pleading for  a
premium  tax and decreasing with the number of domestic firms.  The last term of (20)
is the (unambiguously signed) ODA-inspired premium subsidy.  This subsidy element is
large if the foreign import demand ( X **) is large or, alternatively, when there is a
broad basis for consumer-tying.
The subsequent section presents the derivation of the optimal export insurance terms
when the public insurer’s objective entails a combination of the insurance motive, the
strategic goal underlying export promotion and the political imperative of providing a
particular form of ODA via export insurance to developing countries.
4.2. Efficient coverage, strategic export promotion and ODA in official export 
insurance
An official export insurance agency blending the  motives of  efficient insurance
provision, strategic export promotion and politically coloured ODA-granting faces the
same optimisation scheme as in (25), but now firms have oligopolistic market power.
Proposition 6: Public export insurance contracts for a particular export destination
should not contain ODA-related subsidies and strategic subsidies simultaneously.
Proof:
Since efficient insurance requires complete coverage, g
k =1, the ultimately obtained
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While the second term of expression (21) represents the strategic premium element,
the third term stands for the ODA-related subsidy.  If the  export market is
oligopolistic, the strategic premium subsidy is large if the number of foreign firms
relative to domestic ones is high.   However, the converse is true for the aid-inspired
premium subsidy.  A subsidy-induced increase in domestic exports to market k could















> ), culminating in a price raise of the  imported product for  local
consumers .  In fact, if foreign firms are relatively well represented in the third market,
domestic export premium subsidies may harm consumers in the  importing country.
Then, the political ODA  motive would suggest a domestic premium tax  for exports to
region k.  This follows directly from the fact that the actual price in the importing
country will mainly be the result of the strategic interactions between the competing
firms.
Meanwhile, the case for profit-shifting subsidies becomes stronger if foreign firms are
relatively well present in the market involved.  Hence, we conclude that political
export insurance subsidies are  more  likely to flow to countries where domestic
exporters are dominant, while strategic premium reductions will  be  directed to
destinations where domestic exporters face fierce competition from foreign rivals.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined the provision of export insurance when the public export
insurance agency is not only concerned about efficient risk coverage of export
contracts  involving a risk of default, but also uses its insurance program for strategic
export promotion purposes, and is in addition committed to politically motivated17
grants to developing countries.   More particularly, the implications of these potential
policy motives behind subsidy-incorporated export insurance schemes are investigated.
Providing efficient risk coverage implies full insurance at fair premium rating for all
export destinations.  Yet, if the objective function of the official insurer contains
additional motives framing in the general policy of the government, fair premium rating
will  not  prevail.  Including strategic export promotion and politically motivated
development aid is likely to result in export insurance subsidisation.  However, the
scope for this type of subsidisation is limited.
First,  strategic premium subsidies can only be considered for oligopolistic export
markets where a few domestic exporters compete with foreign rivals.
Second, the model reproduces the well established results in the literature that a
premium subsidy is advised only with complete coverage being offered by the domestic
government and the foreign competing economy.  Still, even with complete insurance,
expected profits of firms are decreasing as the expected default rises.  Therefore, the
scope for profit shifting subsidies will be relatively narrow for export markets with a
high default rate.  This conclusion is reinforced if coverage for high-risk regions is
incomplete.  Then, premium subsidies will enhance the variability of domestic profits,
thereby mitigating the positive strategic effect on expected profits.
Third, taxing insured exports may be preferable to subsidising if foreign exporters are
offered merely partial coverage by their respective official insurance agencies.
Fourth, the scope for politically dictated development assistance via export insurance
subsidisation is limited too.  A necessary condition for ODA-related subsidies is that
domestic exporters have sufficient  market power in a particular developing country.
Only then, the premium subsidy embodied in the insurance contract generates a lower
import price, leading to a consumer surplus enlargement in the importing developing
country.18
Finally, in export markets where firms interact strategically, the motives of profits
shifting and  political ODA  influence the optimal export insurance subsidisation in
opposite ways.
Summarising, although efficient export insurance would imply full coverage contracts
at fair premium rates, the actual policy of official export insurance agencies is often
affected by general goals of the domestic government.  The practice of export
insurance subsidisation is likely to be engendered by such a multiple-goal objective
function.  The relevance of each of these motives will generally differ across export
destinations.  Moreover, alternative goals will have opposite implications for premium
rating.  Oligopolistic export markets with a low default risk offer a relatively wide
scope for strategic subsidisation.  Conversely, high-risk destinations in developing
countries where exports from the domestic economy account for a large share of local
import demand are more likely to benefit from ODA-inspired premium subsidies.
Naturally, the regional pattern observed in export insurance subsidisation is likely to
stem from a combination of the three motives discussed here.19
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